should be redefined and broadened to function as a Joint Coordination Board (JCB) to facilitate the Joint Force Commander (JFC) in his efforts to employ effects-based operations. Essentially, the 'T' in JTCB should be dropped from the title to allow the board to function with a broader operational scope. The JCB will focus on campaign integration and employment of joint forces by effect, rather than merely synchronization of events by component. The proposed construct will provide the JFC with a better staff mechanism and organizational framework with a macrolevel view of the Joint Operations Area (JOA) to integrate forces and coordinate joint fires with operational maneuvers to achieve desired effects. In an effort to attain effects-based operations at the joint level, redefining and expanding the role of the JTCB to function as a JCB makes sense both from a joint and a component perspective. This paper proposes the JFC will be supported better organizationally by redefining and expanding the role of the JTCB to orchestrate campaign integration and synchronization from a macro-level view of the joint operations area (JOA). Basically, the "T" in the JTCB should be dropped from the title to allow the board to function with a broader operational scope as a Joint
Coordination Board (JCB). This name change will be more than symbolic; the focus of the JCB will be orchestrating effects-based operations at the operational level of war rather than only approving recommendations of target sets. The new role and purpose of the JCB will be to focus on the campaign integration and employment of joint forces by effect, rather than merely synchronization by component, to achieve desired operational and/or strategic effects. 5 The JCB construct, as proposed, does not advocate making operational decisions by committee; the JFC will be the final decision-making authority. However, the JCB construct will provide the JFC with a suitable organizational framework for 'operationalizing' effects-based methodologies by integrating and synchronizing forces, and coordinating joint fires and operational maneuvers to achieve desired effects to support campaign objectives.
The concept of effects-based operations is not new and the JCB concept is not a panacea to bring effects-based operations to the forefront of joint/combined operations. However, establishment of a JCB will provide the JFC with a better mechanism to orchestrate force integration and synchronization at the component level to achieve desired operational/strategic effects. Additionally, participation in the JCB will provide components with a better appreciation of the JFC's vision and how their assigned missions contribute to the desired endNotes state. Therefore, redefining the role of the JTCB by broadening the scope of the board makes sense both from a joint perspective, and also from a component force perspective. The JCB will provide better support to the JFC and improve coordination between component commands by focusing on campaign integration and employment of effects-based methodologies at the operational level of war.
This paper assesses the need to 'operationalize' effects-based methodologies at the operational-level of war, reviews the shortcomings of the current JTCB model using examples from Operations Desert Storm and Allied Force, and analyzes two JCB paradigms used by US Central Command (CENTCOM) and NATO's Regional Headquarters Allied Forces Northern Europe (RHQ AFNORTH). The paper proposes a nominal JCB construct with specific roles and responsibilities. In conclusion, the paper offers a set of recommendations to establish a JCB and 'operationalize' effects-based operations and a summary of the benefits of expanding the role of the JTCB to function as a JCB.
NEED FOR EFFECTS-BASED OPERATIONS AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF WAR
Air Force Major General Dave Deptula, a leading proponent of effects-based operations, believes military planners must move beyond their narrow tactical viewpoints and legacy methods that focus on "destroying targets, moving arrows on a map, and waging wars of attrition" and transition to a campaign-planning philosophy to "avoid attrition encounters, applying force at the right place and time to achieve specific operational and strategic effects."
6
Integrating effects-based operations into the campaign plan is dependent upon the ability to Notes identify options, both lethal and non-lethal, to achieve the desired effects that support the JFC's operational and strategic objectives. 7 Current joint doctrine is vague with regard to effects-based operations and the concept of creating synergies through force integration generally results in Service-centric approaches to joint warfare.
8
A primary role and function of the JCB will be to assess the operational situation and advise the JFC on effects-based operations to apply the right force, at the right place, and right time to achieve desired effects. The JFC, his planners and component commanders must understand that "implementing joint effects-based operations will also demand rethinking the assumption that close combat is the only way to defeat opposing land forces." 9 The JCB will add value to the process by ensuring joint forces and joint fires are not only synchronized, but fully integrated to support assigned tasks and missions. Furthermore, the JFC's planners should incorporate effects-based operations methodology into the campaign plan to attain outcomes throughout the battlespace that directly affect the enemy's ability to continue resisting, rather than only employing air and space power to impose pain and punishment.
10
Effects-based operations should be planned, integrated, and employed across the spectrum of the battlespace. After NATO's war over Kosovo, Lieutenant General Short, the commander cannot explain the 'effect' he expects to gain through operational maneuvers and force-on-force engagements, he should not be committing forces to attack the enemy. In the application of effects-based operations, the JFC needs to know when and what to change in a dynamic environment with sufficient force integration and adaptability to win decisively. The JCB is a forum the JFC can use to ensure effects-based operations are considered and applied at the operational level of war, through integration of forces by effect, throughout the campaign.
JTCB SHORTFALLS
The integration of joint targeting into the campaign crosses functional and component seams and is performed at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. The JFC, in consultation with his component commanders, is responsible for setting priorities, providing clear targeting guidance, and determining the weight of effort to be waged during the course of operations.
12
Joint doctrine allows the JFC considerable leeway in determining how best to integrate the targeting function and, depending on the circumstances, the JFC may either retain targeting responsibility on his staff, or delegate some or all of the targeting processes and authority to a subordinate commander. However, the JFC must ensure mechanisms are in place to bring unity of effort to the targeting process as well as to the employment of joint military operations. JFCs typically organize a JTCB as either an integrating center for the joint targeting effort or as a review mechanism. 13 The collaboration between the combatant command, JTF, component commands and national agencies is a critical element that must be fully integrated into the joint targeting process.
The current JTCB construct is designed to provide a forum in which strategies and JFC determines who will lead the JTCB; it is often chaired by the deputy JFC and the J3 is normally tasked to organize the JTCB and serve as a member. Key considerations for the JFC when determining organizational structure, board composition, and concept of operations are:
unity of effort, centralized planning and direction, and decentralized execution.
17
A review of the JTCB construct in previous operations is relevant to discussion of the proposal to redefine and expand its role to function as a JCB with a broader operational scope.
Although it is not within the scope of this paper to provide a lengthy campaign analysis of previous operations, it is useful to view the JTCB from an operational perspective. Arguably, the potential 'value-added' is that a JCB would have provided the JFC a better staff-level mechanism with a macro-level view of the JOA in both Operation Desert Storm and Operation Allied Force.
Notes
14 JP 3-60, Note: Responsibility for developing the JIPTL may reside on the JFC staff, or be delegated to a component commander. The JIPTL is developed to prioritize targets based upon the effects their attacks will have in attaining campaign objectives. It is the JFC's prerogative to assign responsibility to develop the draft JIPTL to whomever he determines best capable. (See JP 3-60, pp. III-3 and III-10 for further details).
16 JP 3-60, III-11. 17 JP 3-0, x.
Operation Desert Storm
The JFC (who dual-hatted himself as the JFLCC) delegated broad targeting authority to his CFACC with regard to developing and maintaining the joint target list (JTL) and the JIPTL. Command and Control, 1942 -1991 , Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1993 21 Tom Clancy with General Chuck Horner (Ret), Every Man a Tiger, New York: G.P. Putnam and Sons, 1999, 471 and 474. maneuvering troops to define the area short of which close air support missions had to be coordinated with ground units; the CFACC could attack targets beyond the FSCL without coordinating with the corps. 22 On the third day of the ground offensive, General McPeak, former Air Force Chief of Staff, asserts the corps commanders moved the FSCL well beyond their ability to affect the close battle without coordinating with either the JFC or CFACC. 23 As a result, the CFACC was prevented from interdicting the main lines of communication (LOC) between Baghdad and Kuwait, creating a 17-hour sanctuary from air strikes for retreating Iraqi units. 24 After the war, the JFC admitted he had known little of this friction between his corps commanders and the CFACC. 25 In the final analysis, the Army corps commanders "had little to complain about, other than not having been properly kept in the loop" by the JFC. 
Operation Allied Force
During NATO's air war over Kosovo, the CFACC was not afforded the same broad targeting authority enjoyed by the CFACC in Operation Desert Storm. There is ample evidence the US European Command (EUCOM) combatant commander was routinely involved in microlevel targeting decisions. 28 Aside from the fact that there were two parallel command structures (US and NATO), it should be noted that the operational commanders in both the US and NATO chains of command were dual-hatted in corresponding roles.
29
The combatant commander established a disjointed and cumbersome organizational structure that imposed non-standard targeting processes between multiple commands and impeded the JFC's ability to streamline the target nomination and approval process. 30 The multilayered command and staff-level mechanisms lacked a coherent organizational framework and inhibited unity of command and unity of effort. Kosovo, 1999 ," Santa Monica, CA: RAND Arroyo Center, 2002 designation of the NATO ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) commander as the JFLCC may have proved beneficial to conducting air operations over Kosovo and may have increased the effectiveness of air operations against fielded forces by bringing land expertise into the process.
33
Although the General Clark considered designating a JFLCC, he opted to defer the appointment to avoid organizational complications between the US and NATO command structures.
34
Effects-based targeting methodology is well understood by US air power professionals, but it was not widely employed during Operation Allied Force. Although JTF Noble Anvil established a JTCB to review targets, it did not function as prescribed in joint doctrine.
35
Benjamin Lambeth asserts targeting decisions seemed to entail "parceling out sortie and munitions allocations by target category, without much consideration for how a target's neutralization might contribute toward advancing the campaign's objectives."
36 General Jumper described the process as "campaign-by-target-list management" whereby planners simply managed the list of approved targets on a daily basis rather than applying effects-based methodologies. 37 In testimony to the US Senate, Lieutenant General Short acknowledged that the national command authorities of each NATO nation had a role to play in target selection and approval, but at some point the JFC and his CFACC should have been given approved target sets and categories from which to choose specific targets at the operational and tactical levels.
38
In place of the JTCB, the JFC needs a high-level coordination board, like the proposed commander. 43 The basic premise of the JCB construct is that components conduct supporting operations, not independent campaigns, and that planning and executing operations is an iterative and continuous process.
44
The JCB is used to assist component commanders' planning, coordination, and synchronization of limited joint fires resources. 45 The JCB is also used to promulgate JFC priorities and intent, and refine his targeting guidance to component commanders. 46 The JCB maintains a macro-level view of the JOA and ensures unity of effort throughout the campaign by focusing 72-96 hours out. 47 The CENTCOM JCB also assigns supported/supporting commander relationships for specified missions and tasks.
48
The JFC's guidance and objectives are used to focus target development and evaluation of potential targets using a systems analysis approach to identify critical target sets that, if attacked, are likely to achieve desired effects. The CENTCOM J2 is responsible for producing the JTL to support JTFs and designated operational plans (OPLANs 
RHQ AFNORTH JCB Construct
The JCB construct employed in RHQ AFNORTH describes campaign synchronization as the coordination and prioritization of all effort in order to maximize the effectiveness and synergism of combined forces. 52 The construct describes joint targeting as a process of selecting targets and matching the appropriate response to achieve a desired political or military objective. 53 The joint coordination process envisioned by RHQ AFNORTH synchronizes the 
THE WAY AHEAD: JCB ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
The main proposition of this paper is that by redefining and expanding the role of the current JTCB to a JCB construct, the JFC will be better supported in orchestrating the efforts of his component commands to achieve campaign integration and effects-based operations. Both the CENTCOM and AFNORTH models provide a basis from which to organize a suitable framework to meet the specific needs of a JFC. Although neither model is all encompassing, each have merits that should be adopted and utilized in a JCB construct designed to bring effectsbased operations methodologies to the operational level of war.
The proposed role and purpose of the JCB is to focus on the integration and employment of joint forces by effect, rather than merely synchronization by component. The establishment of a JCB will provide the JFC with a forum to ensure force integration, synchronization, and employment is designed to achieve specific desired effects in support of the campaign plan.
Experimentation with the concept should be conducted through joint exercises to determine how best to 'operationalize' the JCB construct to meet the JFC's compressed decision cycles and battle rhythm in a dynamic environment.
As the US force structure continues to shrink and operational demands increase, the JFC cannot afford to allow his components to fight inefficient parallel campaigns. In the absence of unlimited resources, the JFC must balance the attainment of operational objectives with limitations placed on operations. Redefining and expanding the role of the JTCB to focus on campaign integration and effects-based operations makes sense both from a joint perspective, and also from a component force perspective. The establishment of a JCB will help rather than hinder the JFC in striking the right balance among conflicting imperatives with regard to integrating forces and selecting appropriate courses of action in support of the joint campaign.
The JCB will also serve to ensure component commanders are kept abreast of the JFC's vision and the wider operational issues he must contend with throughout the course of the campaign.
The key to integrating component planning in the battlespace is through their active participation in the joint coordination process set forth in a JCB construct.
JCB Composition
The JCB will facilitate the joint coordination process to integrate component planning and synchronize events in a dynamic environment. Each JTF Headquarters (HQ) staff function and each component will have specific responsibilities in the joint coordination process and the JCB. Nominally, the deputy JFC will serve as the chairman of the JCB and the JFC's J3 will be tasked to organize the JCB, provide facilities for the staff support element, and serve as a member of the JCB. The members of the JCB, as depicted in Figure 1 
JCB Staff Element (JCBSE)
The JCBSE will be comprised of staff officers, mirroring the composition of the JCB, and will be tasked to assist the J3 in preparing for the JCB meeting; the director will be designated by the J3. The director will appoint a member of the JCBSE to attend and take minutes of the JCB meetings and disseminate the daily meeting minutes to JCB participants. Accurate meeting minutes will be a necessary feature to relay the JFC's key guidance and concerns to component commanders to avoid misinterpretations and pitfalls associated with the video-teleconference In current joint doctrine, the J3 Joint Fires Element (JFE) is an optional staff element that may be adapted to form the core of the JCBSE. 56 The JCBSE will be tasked to support the JCB in its functions and responsibilities, as described below. The aim of the JCBSE is to review the current operational assessment, the JFC's direction and guidance, and agree to any proposed changes to the JCO prior to submitting it to the JCB for consideration and subsequent approval by the JFC. The component command liaisons to the JCBSE must have the authority to propose courses of action, voice concerns and state the position of their sending commander.
JCB Functions and Responsibilities
The primary objective of the JCB is to attain the most efficient use of the JFC's forces, resources, and assets by capitalizing on their synergistic effects. During the execution phases of the campaign, the focus of the JCB will be on the time frame between 3 and 10 days ahead. This period of time conforms to the requirements of the air tasking order (ATO) cycle; it is also adaptable to the JFLCC's scheme of operational maneuver and looks out far enough to prepare components for impending and future operations without interfering with current operations. As set out in the nominal agenda, Table 1 , the JCB will serve as a facilitating function to provide top-level campaign integration, synchronization and joint targeting oversight functions for the JFC. The JCB should meet daily, or as directed by the chairman, in concert with the JFC's battle rhythm and decision-making cycle. The aim is to facilitate force integration, synchronization and employment to achieve desired effects in concert with the JFC's objectives, direction and guidance. Courses of action, timing and tempo of joint fires and operational maneuvers will be integrated by effect and synchronized by event to support the JFC's objectives, taking account of operational requirements and capabilities, as well as political and legal constraints. The JCB will assign specific tasks and mission responsibilities to components and integrate, synchronize, prioritize, and de-conflict all aspects of joint fires and operational maneuvers. The functions and responsibilities of the JCB include assessing and recommending courses of action to the JFC, with regard to the operational issues depicted in Table 2 . 
Joint Coordination Order (JCO)
The JCB will prepare a JCO for the JFC to amplify or change his direction and guidance to his component commanders. The JCO will be issued by phase, and may also be issued on a daily basis (if required) or in preparation for significant operational events. Although the JCO is primarily intended to cover the period of 3 to 10 days ahead, it may be used to provide essential direction and guidance for immediate action in a dynamic environment. The JCO is not intended to be a replacement for the OPORD; it is intended to amplify guidance for operations that are due to take place within the next 3 to 10 days, and identify supported and supporting command relationships for specific missions and tasks in one document.
The JCO provides, in one document, the overall operational focus of the campaign for the next 3 to 10 days by detailing the interaction of all forces and capabilities, lethal and non-lethal, that the JFC has available to achieve his mission objectives. For example, the JCO will provide broad guidance for the integration of army deep assets and naval and marine air assets into the JFACC's air plan to support operational objectives. The purpose of the JCO is to refine the JFC's guidance to components for operations that are scheduled to take place within the timeframe of the current OPORD. The format for the JCO, depicted in Table 3 , contains five main paragraphs.
Table 3. JCO Format

Serial
"Subject"
(1) JFC's "Intent" for the next 3 to 10 day period.
(2) "Points of Main Effort and Desired Effect." 
JCB Role in Targeting
The functional and organizational challenge facing the JFC is how to achieve unity of command and unity of effort throughout the joint campaign. The ability to integrate and synchronize joint fires and operational maneuvers in the most effective and coordinated manner is crucial for success at the operational level of war. An integral part of the joint coordination process, involving targeting for effect, is the incorporation of information operations into the campaign plan. Although initiation of information operations begins with the development of the OPLAN, it should be a top-level priority reviewed by the JCB to ensure resources are maximized to attain desired effects. The joint coordination and targeting process is also responsible for providing documentation that maintains a logical linkage between the JFC's direction and guidance, and current operations. 62 This targeting documentation should trace the analytical reasoning that supports the nomination of targets and details of anticipated effects.
The JFC should delegate broad targeting responsibilities to the JFACC, who is normally the component commander with the preponderance of assets to service targets on the JIPTL and has the necessary planning expertise resident in the JAOC. This joint coordination process also provides a channel for the JCB to discuss mitigation of risk for the attacking force and assess the probability of attaining the desired effects.
JCB Role in Synchronizing Operational Maneuvers
Attaining synergy through force integration and synchronization of joint fires and operational maneuver is of particular significance in the context of air-land operations.
63
Without mechanisms to ensure forces are integrated, Professor Philip Sabin of King's College, London, contends it is "possible that two forces may interfere with one another and have an overall affect which is less than the sum of their individual parts." 64 A function of the JCB will be to review FSCMs and set conditions for the timing and tempo of FSCL changes in relation to the JFC's scheme of operational maneuver. According to Army General Crosbie Saint's view of the JFC's role in shaping and integrating forces to achieve synergy in joint operations, the JFC should provide "prudent, personal control when necessary, while avoiding too much interference" with his component commanders. 65 In practice, the JCB will be responsible to the JFC for maintaining a macro-level view of the JOA in order to achieve the synergy of an effectsbased operation.
The aim of operational maneuver is to position forces for rapid transition to apply appropriate joint fires, lethal and non-lethal, against the enemy. The JCB, maintaining a macrolevel view of the JOA, will be involved in the process to integrate forces and synchronize joint fires and operational maneuvers in support of the JFC's concept of operations. In this role, the JCB will review and recommend how far in front of friendly ground forces the FSCL should be established, and correspondingly, how much airspace above the close battle should belong to the JFLCC. Air Force Major General Tim Kinnan, former Commandant of Air War College, regards the FSCL as a tactical FSCM that has the potential for "unintended consequences at the operational level" and should therefore be under the purview of the JFC. 66 The synchronization of operational maneuver is an appropriate issue for the JCB to consider because only the JFC has the authority over forces operating throughout the JOA. The ultimate aim of maneuver warfare is to "get as directly as possible to the strategic center of gravity… by economizing on engagements." 67 The essence of operational art in joint warfare is the ability to integrate air, land, sea, and space forces by effect, and not merely synchronization of events by component.
Notes
RECOMMENDATIONS
The JFC is ultimately responsible for integrating, synchronizing, and employing joint forces to achieve campaign objectives in pursuit of operational and strategic objectives. The JTCB should be redefined and expanded to function as a JCB to provide better support to the JFC in orchestrating the efforts of component commands to attain campaign objectives. The proposed JCB construct will provide the JFC with a better staff mechanism and organizational framework, with a macro-level view of the JOA, to 'operationalize' effects-based operations.
JFCs should adopt the following five recommendations to establishment a JCB to integrate forces by effect, rather than merely synchronizing events by component:
(1) Redefine and expand the role of the JTCB. Symbolically, this change should start with a name change by dropping the 'T' from the board's title. These changes will allow the forum to function with a broader operational scope as a JCB.
(2) The role and purpose of the JCB should be to focus on the integration and employment of joint forces by effect and to synchronize joint fires and operational maneuvers to achieve desired effects.
(3) Delegate responsibility to the JFACC to develop the draft JIPTL using effectsbased methodologies to attain campaign objectives in the shortest possible time and on terms favorable to the US.
(4) The JFC should not dual-hat himself; each component in a JTF should be an active participant in the joint coordination process.
(5) JFCs should experiment with the proposed JCB construct in joint exercises to determine how best to implement campaign integration and effects-based operations into the operational level of war.
CONCLUSION
Redefining the role of the JTCB by broadening the scope of the board makes sense both from a joint perspective, and also from a component force perspective. The proposed JCB construct will add value to the joint planning and coordination process by ensuring component forces are integrated and synchronized to achieve desired effects. Through active participation in the JCB, components will have a better appreciation of the JFC's vision and concept of operations and how their assigned missions and tasks contribute to the desired end-state. One of the greatest challenges facing a JFC is how to orchestrate and integrate joint forces so that they are capable of achieving effects-based operations and attain operational/strategic objectives. By expanding and redefining the role of the JTCB, the establishment of a JCB will help the JFC 'operationalize' effects-based operations by striking the right balance among conflicting imperatives with regard to integrating forces and selecting appropriate courses of action throughout the course of the joint campaign. Battlespace. The environment, factors and conditions that must be understood to successfully apply combat power, protect the force, or complete the mission. This includes the air, land, sea, space, and the enemy and friendly forces; facilities; weather; terrain; the electromagnetic spectrum; and the information environment within the operational areas and areas of interest.
GLOSSARY of TERMS
(JP 1-02, 51) The FSCL applies to all fires of air, land, and sea-based weapon systems using any type of ammunition. Forces attacking targets beyond the FSCL must inform all affected commanders in sufficient time to allow necessary reaction to avoid fratricide. Supporting elements attacking targets beyond the FSCL must ensure that the attack will not produce adverse effects on, or to the rear of, the line. Short of a FSCL, all air-to-ground and surface-to-surface attack operations are controlled by the appropriate land or amphibious force commander. Ideally, the FSCL should follow well defined terrain features. Coordination of attacks beyond the FSCL is especially critical to commanders of air, land, and special operations forces. In exceptional circumstances, the inability to conduct this coordination will not preclude the attack of targets beyond the FSCL. However, failure to do so may increase the risk of fratricide and could waste limited resources. (JP 1-02, 160)
Centers of gravity (COG
Guidance, Apportionment, and Targeting (GAT). The GAT team in the JAOC's Combat Plans Division, is responsible for development of a comprehensive JIPTL. Additionally, the GAT team synchronizes aerospace targeting among the respective components, provides a macro-level feasibility review across the components. The GAT may opt to host a daily Joint Target Coordination Working Group (JTCWG) with components to refine the JIPTL prior to the JCB. (AFI 13-1 AOC V3). Manuever. Employment of forces on the battlefield through movement in combination with fire, or fire potential, to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy in order to accomplish the mission. (JP 1-02, 253)
Information Operations (IO)
Operational level of war. The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or operational areas. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to accomplish the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about and sustain these events. These activities imply a broader dimension of time or space than do tactics; they ensure the logistic and administrative support of tactical forces, and provide the means by which tactical successes are exploited to achieve strategic objectives. (JP 1-02, 311)
Political Adviser (POLAD). The political adviser on the JFC's headquarters staff, a liaison from the US State Department.
Synchronization. The arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce a maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time. 415) 
